Abstract: Common morality endorses some form of an exceptionless prohibition against killing innocents. Natural lawyers employ double-effect reasoning (DER) to address hard cases involving deaths of the innocent. Current deontologists (Scanlon and Thomson) criticize DERproponents as conflating act-with agent-evaluations. Scanlon develops this critique extensively. I respond to his criticism. He maintains that the DER-advocate tells a badly-motivated agent to refrain from an obligatory act. Thus, he asserts, the natural lawyer who employs DER errs.
in the particular way claimed by the doctrine of double effect, even though this apparent significance is illusory" (2008, 8) . 3 We read this in the first chapter of Moral Dimensions, entitled "The Illusory Appeal of Double Effect" (Scanlon, 2008, 8) . Before considering Scanlon's account, DER requires attention.
Briefly, thinkers who propose DER hold the following: answers to the question "what makes conduct permissible or impermissible?" partially depend upon answers to the prior question "what makes conduct to be conduct?" It is not for nothing that DER-proponents such as
Aquinas and (following his lead) Anscombe each explicitly and at length address the more fundamental question (what makes an action an action?) Such thinkers partially rely on mental states such as intent and deliberation when they attempt to answer act-evaluation questions. 4 Historically, DER arises out of Aquinas' accounts of natural law and human action. One finds the locus classicus in Thomas' Summa theologiae IIaIIae, q. 64, a.7. There, in inchoate form, Aquinas presents the basic criteria of DER. Employing those criteria, he, in effect,
proposes that an otherwise permissible act 5 productive of good and bad is permissible if the agent intends the good while foreseeing, but not intending, the bad (either as an end or as a means). Were the agent to intend the bad (as a means or end), the otherwise permissible act would be impermissible. 6 More or less following Aquinas, DER-proponents hold that, in certain cases, ceteris paribus, foresight of a bad consequence ethically differs from intent of the same, such that the former is permissible while the latter is not. For example, DER-theorists contrast some instances of tactical bombing from consequentially comparable terror bombing insofar as (in an otherwise just war) the former does not, while the latter does, incorporate the agent's intent to harm non-combatants (as a means). Thus, advocates of DER hold that the distinction between intent and foresight (henceforth the I/F distinction) has ethical import. More to the point for our purposes, they hold that in the debated cases, the I/F distinction marks off impermissible acts from permissible acts. Scanlon disputes precisely this point. Yet, exactly how does DER lead one astray; in what does the supposed illusion consist?
II. The Purported Error: Conflation of Act-with Agent-Assessment.
While acknowledging the intuitive appeal of the I/F distinction, Scanlon (2008, 17-8) proposes that DER's advocates misplace its import (2008, . 7 Scanlon proposes the Deliberative/Critical (henceforth, D/C) distinction as explanatory of the I/F distinction's appeal.
As Scanlon acknowledges (2008, 27) , the D/C distinction resembles an Act-assessment/Agentassessment (henceforth Act/Agent) distinction one finds, e.g., in Judith Jarvis Thomson.
Thomson asserts that to use DER and, more specifically, to acknowledge the I/F distinction's ethical import, amounts to: …a failure to take seriously enough the fact-I think it is plainly a fact-that the question whether it is morally permissible for a person to do a thing is just not the same as the question whether the person who does it is thereby shown to be a bad person (Thomson, 1999, 517) . 8 Scanlon slightly modifies Thomson's Act/Agent distinction by specifying that the deliberative element concerns the action's permissibility while the critical element concerns:
…a special kind of agent-assessment, in which what is being assessed is not the agent's overall character but rather the quality of the particular piece of decision making that led to the action in question (2008, .
Accordingly, as Scanlon notes, the D/C distinction has a more narrow scope than Thomson Briefly, the D/C distinction bears on the I/F distinction insofar as Scanlon proposes that the deliberative employment of an ethical principle (such as one bearing on the use of deadly force in a just war (2008, 28) ), "may concern what the agent sees as reasons for acting, or other features of his state of mind, but they need not and often do not do so" (2008, 22) . That is, according to Scanlon, an Agent's mental states, and, in particular, intentions, typically do not serve as a basis for rendering an act permissible or impermissible. More specifically, in the standard cases of tactical/terror bombing, which DER contrasts as permissible/impermissible, reference to an agent's intent lacks direct ethical relevance.
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Consider the military cases. Scanlon writes that his account of principles admitting exceptions complemented by the D/C distinction is the "best" (he admits that it is not the only;
indeed, DER appears to be the chief competitor, albeit ultimately mistaken) way of understanding ethical principles concerning lethal war conduct (2008, 28) . 10 Here follows
Scanlon's description of the exceptions to the relevant principle:
In war, one is sometimes permitted to use destructive and potentially deadly force of a kind that would normally be prohibited. But such force is permitted only when its uses can be expected to bring some military advantage, such as destroying enemy combatants or war-making materials, and it is permitted only if expected harm to noncombatants is as small as possible, compatible with gaining the relevant military advantage, and only if this harm is "proportional" to the importance of this advantage (2008, 28) .
On the face of things, an initial reading of these exceptions suggests that the use of deadly force upon combatants (terror bombing) is, at times, a permissible exception. 11 For, as customarily understood in the literature, terror bombing involves the targeting of non-combatants to the extent necessary (and no more) in order to shorten the war by undermining support for the same.
Moralists who debate these matters conceive of terror bombing as militarily advantageous. 12 Indeed, for this very reason, they take it as a perfect foil to tactical bombing by which to consider the merits of DER and its competitors. So conceived, it would seem to be permissible, according to the above criteria. Scanlon's dispute with the I/F distinction reduces to a more basic issue concerning how much control agents have over their intentions of ends pursued in action, or over the reasons on account of which they act. As he uses the term, 'reason' refers to the intended end on account of which the agent acts. So, to stick with our military example, tactical bombing instances the act of dropping bombs with the intended end or reason of furthering the war effort. No dispute here; we remain on common territory. According to Scanlon, however, fulfilling the criteria for an exception to the prohibition, the deed is permissible, regardless of the intended end with which the agent performs it. Here we encounter the disputed terrain. So, for example, according to Scanlon, if a vengeful agent intends to drop bombs in order to terrorize civilians while concomitantly and foreseeably, but not intentionally, destroying military installation, she merits blame although her deed remains permissible.
Why does her reason, her actually intended end (e.g., of vengeance for the deaths of her loved ones) in the here and now case of acting, not enter into the considerations that bear on the Deliberative permissible/impermissible act-evaluation (in contrast to only bearing on agentassessment in the Critical use of the principle)? Scanlon writes:
Why, then, doesn't the question of permissibility apply to the reasons for which an agent acts as well as to the expected effects of the action? The answer ... is that the question of permissibility arises only with respect to alternatives between which an agent can choose (2008, 88 Scanlon asks an importantly different question, namely: is an obligatory action permissible when accompanied by double effects in which the agent intends the bad and not the good? (Of course, the question has affinities to the one the DER-theorist asks. The relevant point concerns the import of the difference obligatoriness makes to one's answer, as will become evident, below.) Second, and perhaps more importantly, thinkers who use DER address competent agents.
Certainly, its advocates do propose that an agent ought to do the right deed for the right reason and to refrain from doing the right deed for the wrong reason. In the case of the incompetent agent, Scanlon supposes that DER-theorists would err by telling her not to do the obligatory deed. Yet, if the only way she can do the right deed is for the wrong reason, why is it so clear to Scanlon that the DER-advocate would require that one actually tell the incompetent agent to refrain from the obligatory deed?
To introduce considerations about incompetent agents regarding obligatory acts as a basis for rejecting DER puzzles. This is particularly so insofar as Scanlon concedes that normally competent agents can do what DER would ask of them (2008, . Namely, they can act for the right reasons they possess. Indeed, this would appear to form part of the basis for regarding them as competent. This instances a (perhaps, the) DER-advocate's response to Scanlon's imagined obligatory case of rescue by an incompetent agent. When faced with obligatory action, the DER-theorist would tell the abnormally incompetent agent to do the right deed for the wrong reason (or the only reason for which he is able to do it). When he so acts, he acts permissibly and wrongly. Of course, here Scanlon will object that we must take the assessment of wrong and put it within agent-assessment. For, how could a right, obligatory act also be wrong?
Aquinas nicely answers this question:
just as in syllogisms, given one error (inconvenienti) it is necessary that others follow; so also in morals, one error posited, from necessity others follow. Just as, supposing that someone seeks empty glory, he sins, whether on account of vainglory he does or does not do what he is obliged to do (facere tenetur) (Summa theologiae, IaIIae, q.19, a. 6, ad 3).
Why think, as Scanlon does, that an act produced by an incompetent agent has nothing wrong with it? Is it not, as Aquinas notes, more reasonable to think that an inept agent produces inapt acts? It is logical that the incompetent agent's act be permissible (in fact, obligatory) while also being wrong, bent, defective, and bad: given one absurdity, others must follow.
V. Conclusion: DER Emerges Unscathed.
Let us consider our third and final question. How does DER fare? Scanlon's quarrel with doing an obligatory deed. As we have seen, employing DER does not require (or, for that matter, even incline one in the direction of) such a position. The critique of the I/F distinction's appeal as illusory rests upon an unexamined assumption, namely, that if one thinks that act-analysis concerning permissibility partially depends on an agent's intent, then given an incompetent agent, one must tell her to refrain from doing her duty. For she can only do so by acting for the wrong reason. As Aquinas' treatment of perplexity suggests, however, the DER theorist does not hold this, nor need he. Beginning with a false assumption about DER, Scanlon rejects the account as illusory. Moreover, Scanlon's alternative approach to hard cases does not inspire confidence in those who share his deontological commitments (in particular, its apparent inability to assess terror bombing as impermissible). Fortunately, we do not require such an alternative: DER emerges unscathed.
As noted at the outset, the preceding responds principally to Scanlon's critique.
Nonetheless, given the general form of his criticism, the above suggests that those who employ the Act-/Agent-evaluation distinction against DER err. For, as Scanlon nicely puts it, the agent in question lacks competence qua agent. Accordingly, insofar as agents as agents produce acts, the defective agent makes a flawed product, a defective act, as ought to be expected and, more importantly, as ought to be. 19 
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For a consideration of U.S. Constitutional casuistry analogous to DER, see Cavanaugh, 2006, 192-5; see also, Lyons, 2005. 2 Variously called the "principle," "rule" or "doctrine of double effect," DER consists of a set of criteria for assessing the permissibility of an otherwise permissible act productive of a tobe-avoided effect. (Concerning the phrase, "otherwise permissible act," see note 5, below.)
"Doctrine" connotes an authoritative teaching. This gives some the impression that DER-which originates in the work of the mediaeval theologian and saint, Thomas Aquinas-is ultimately a religious teaching. It is not; rather it is a way of reasoning about hard ethical cases. "Principle"
and "rule" bring to mind one criterion rather than a number of criteria. This misleads some to think that the I/F distinction alone matters, discounting the import of the other criteria. To avoid such confusions, I employ the phrase "double-effect reasoning." Anscombe at once single-handedly revives action theory while initiating the on-going debate concerning DER. She regards the denial of the I/F distinction's moral import as definitive of that ethic she names "consequentialism" (Anscombe, 1958, 10) . Aquinas authors DER, as noted. Less well noted, however, is the fact that his introduction of DER (found in Summa theologiae, IIaIIae, q.64, a.7) occurs only after an extensive treatment of human action found in the prior part of the same work, IaIIae, q. There he notes that differences in mental states such as decision and deliberation in part make an act to be one of justice or injustice. Needless to say, mental states alone do not make acts permissible or impermissible. Good and bad effects of acts-the world, creatures, and humans being better or worse off because of acts-also play crucial roles in act-evaluations.
5
"Otherwise permissible act" refers to a partial act-evaluation that rests upon a partial actdescription. A certain type of act, described up to a point, but not yet entirely, would be an otherwise permissible act. An act of bombing in a just war causing the destruction of a munitions dump and harm to non-combatants where one has already satisfactorily answered questions concerning the necessity of the act, the inevitability of the harm, the proportionality between the good and the bad effects, and so on, instances an otherwise permissible act. The question(s) remaining concern solely the role of the different intentions structuring the various acts that could be so described. Were a bomber to intend the destruction of the dump while foreseeing but not intending the harm to non-combatants, we would have an instance of tactical bombing. By contrast, were a bomber to intend harm to non-combatants while foreseeing but not intending the destruction of the ordinance, we would have a case of terror bombing. focus on such cases (namely, those in which changes to intent move the act-assessment from permissible to impermissible). One finds numerous statements of the DER criteria. A gathering of the same can be found in the account of DER Scanlon considers (2008, 218) . That is, Cavanaugh, 2006, 1-37. 7 He thinks that intent (sometimes, albeit rarely) has relevance in act-assessment (or in deliberative employment of a principle). It does so in special "expression and expectation cases" (Scanlon, 2008, 39 et passim) . As he notes, these do not instance the type of cases DER addresses. Thus, a consideration of them lacks relevance to our current inquiry.
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Critics of DER repeatedly make this move. Indeed, one finds Thomson's (1999) version of this distinction in critics such as Bennett. As Bennett notes (1995, 46) , Donagan (1977) first 3) Incompetent agents produce (negative value term) acts.
Thus, it is prima facie reasonable to think--as do DER advocates--that the incompetent agent's act will be defective, just as she is, for the act is her product; defective artists produce defective art. Indeed, they do so precisely in their defectiveness as producers. The opponent of that (almost?) analytical claim bears the burden of proof. Because such considerations would take us too far afield from our quarry, put them to the side and let us return to the engagement between Scanlon and DER. 16 In the very work in which his critique of DER occurs, Scanlon proposes a revisionist account of blame in which "people can be blamed for things [such as reasons] that are not under their control" (2008, 212) . This puzzles. According to Scanlon, act-assessment ought not refer to an agent's reasons, because incompetent agents do not exert control over their reasons. Yet, such agents themselves can be assessed as blameworthy although they lack this control. Why does the absence of control not result in a judgement of non-blameworthiness concerning agents analogous to that of permissibility concerning their acts? Alternatively, if lack of control does not affect agent-blameworthiness, why ought lack of control over reasons affect actpermissibility?
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Hallvard Lillehammer moots an allied undeveloped form of this criticism (Lillehammer, 2010, 582 
